its influence been evidently unidirectional.
2 Rather than historical, however, my own account in this case is essentially "structural." A specific aspect of the more general topic of literature and science that has attracted considerable attention pertains to the question of language, both at the level of the production of scientific and literary texts, and at the level of their reading within a specific social, cultural, and political context. Such studies are naturally related to constructivist approaches to the history of science. 3 I do not follow such an approach here or elsewhere, and in general it can be said that constructivist approaches have been much less followed in relation to mathematics than to other fields of science. 4 Nevertheless, as already suggested, the different uses of language in each of the three realms considered will be also discussed as part of my analysis.
Mathematics, History, and Narrative -Three Kinds of Texts:
An illuminating connection between mathematics and the Aristotelian passage quoted above was established in the work of Sabetai Unguru on the history of Greek mathematics. By referring to
Aristotle's distinction between history and poetry, Unguru intended to stress a parallel distinction that in his view is fundamental, and should be strictly observed, when writing the history of mathematics. The "thing that has been," which is the singular, the idiosyncratic, is the object of historical research, and the historian should strive to understand and convey it in his or her research. The "thing that might be,"while of "more philosophical and of graver import" (and thus arguably more interesting), is none of the historian's professional business. But what Aristotle put forward here as a general distinction has a peculiar turn when it comes to mathematics, since it, like Aristotelian poetry, deals with universal statements-statements "as to what such or such a kind of [entity] will probably or necessarily" behave like.
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If Aristotle found it necessary to clarify the difference between the historical and the poetic approach to describing events of the past, he obviously felt that the borderline between the two could be somewhat elusive. The affinity between mathematics and poetry in the sense described above makes this borderline even more elusive, as Unguru has shown in his own analysis. Indeed, in analyzing mathematics of the past, mathematicians often look for underlying mathematical concepts, regularities, or affinities in order to conclude about historical connection. Mathematical affinity necessarily follows from universal properties of the entities involved, and this has often been taken to suggest a certain historical scenario that "might be." But, Unguru warns us, one should be very careful not to allow such mathematical arguments to lead us into mistaking historical truth (i.e., the "thing that has been") with what is no more than mathematically possible scenarios (i.e., the "thing that might be"). The former can only be found by direct historical evidence.
Incidentally, the classical example of this debate concerns one of Aristotle's historical assertions:
namely, that the Pythagoreans discovered the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of the square. Aristotle says in the relevant passage that they proved this by a reductio ad absurdum argument, 5 See, for instance, Sabetai Unguru, "History of Ancient Mathematics: Some Reflections on the State of the Art," Isis 70 (1979): 555-565.
since "odd numbers come out equal to evens" (Prior Analytics, 1:23). If we now look at the standard modern proof of the irrationality of √2, we realize that it nicely fits Aristotle's description, since it is indeed based on showing that a number that is assumed odd must necessarily be even. This underlying mathematical affinity is added to Aristotle's account-in the "poetic approach" to the history of mathematics-in order to infer the validity of a purely historical claim. It is thus inferred that the Pythagoreans proved the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side exactly as we nowadays prove that √2 is an irrational number. 6 Unguru's point of view, on the contrary, implies that this conclusion is invalid, and that, moreover, it embodies a historiographical point of view that is utterly wrong.
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Along the guidelines provided by the Aristotelian distinction, Unguru, in 1975, called attention to "the need to rewrite the history of Greek mathematics." 8 His work immediately attracted furious reactions, above all from three prominent mathematicians interested in the history of mathematics:
André Weil, Bartel van der Waerden, and Hans Freudenthal. 9 A main argument implicitly underlying their rejoinders concerned the question of authority on matters pertaining to mathematical knowledge.
This authority seemed to be transgressed here by an outsider who dared to refute a claim that had never 6 As classically presented, for instance, in Carl B. Boyer, A History of Mathematics (New York: Wiley, 1968), p. 80. 7 For an alternative proof that differs from the modern one, see, for example, Victor J. It is revealing that throughout his lecture, Weil consistently used the term "mathematical history," rather than "history of mathematics." Clearly, his main point was not to discuss the "why" or "how," as his title had it, but rather the "who." He asked: "How much mathematical knowledge should one possess in order to deal with mathematical history?" And in his answer, as expected, authority plays an important role: "There is no doubt at all that a scientist can possess or acquire all the qualities needed to do excellent work in the history of his science; the greater his talent as a scientist, the better his historical work is likely to be."
As a founding member of the Bourbaki group, Weil promoted not only many of the basic views of Bourbakian mathematics, but also of Bourbakian historiography. The latter is a most salient example of what Ivor Grattan-Guinness described as "the royal road to me"-kind of historiography. 11 Good history of mathematics is written, according to this view, based mainly on purely mathematical considerations and should thus be written only by mathematicians, preferably by prominent, retired ones.
From the perspective of more than twenty-five years later, the kind of historiography promoted by Unguru has become mainstream and needs no further justification. This is particularly the case concerning his views about algebra and geometry in Greek mathematics. 12 But, harking back to the opening quotation, what is of real concern for us in the present context is the parallel drawn by Unguru between Aristotle's distinction and the relationship between mathematics and its history. This parallel can be summarized as follows: Like all narrative fiction, mathematics in fiction may include real characters and real historical situations as part of the plot, but ideally these appear as archetypes that represent a universal person or situation.
Mathematics

History of Mathematics
Authors of narrative fiction, and in particular mathematics in fiction, may try to remain as close as possible to what they consider to be the historical truth, but it is not inherent in the genre that this should be the case. More importantly, no reason can compel the reader to read the text other than as pure fiction-a point I will stress again below.
At the same time, however, the Aristotelian distinction confronts us with a seemingly odd situation; indeed, it would seem intuitively more natural to associate the two narrative activities (history and fiction) with each other, rather than contraposing them as in diagram 2. This seems all the more odd if we take into consideration that in making his distinction, Aristotle was implicitly taking for granted a classical conception that viewed history as a literary genre-indeed, as a rather inferior one at that. This conception of history as narrative remained strongly ingrained for many centuries, and was apparent even in nineteenth-century historiography. Positivist historians such as Leopold von Ranke (1795 -1886 , who led the efforts directed at turning history into a discipline based on scientific principles of objectivity and empirical evidence (Wissenschaft), continued to stress the fundamentally story-like character of their endeavors. 15 The Aristotelian distinction itself, on the other hand, though it continues to be fundamental to the general question of the relationship between literature and history, needs to be reconsidered from the perspective of more recent developments in literary theory.
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One additional possible perspective from which to regard the triangular relationship that we are considering here concerns the kind of language typically used in representative texts of each of the three disciplines. Viewed from this perspective, mathematics in fiction and the history of mathematics do indeed align-as opposed to mathematics-as indicated in the following diagram: very extreme cases, 17 significant parts of any mathematical argument are always put forward in, or mixed with, natural language. On the other hand, these texts are never truly discursive, and they will always contain, at the core, a formal, semi-formal, or, at least, a formalizable argument. Texts on the history of mathematics and mathematics in fiction may typically contain formal, semi-formal, or formalizable parts themselves, but once again, they will always contain a discursive core. In a spectrum ranging from the purely formal to the purely discursive, mathematical texts will be closer to the formal pole, whereas historical and fictional texts about mathematics will be closer to the discursive one. 
Mathematics
History of
Suspension of Disbelief:
"Suspension of disbelief" is the fundamental attitude on which the very possibility of the poetic (and narrative) act is based. Without the basic willingness on the part of the reader to accept a priori the rules of the game and the limitations set by the author, no act of poetic interchange can ever take place. The reader must be willing to follow any kind of logic adopted by the author, to give up demands for strict and coherent realism, and to follow the author to wherever he takes the plot and characters. This holds equally true, of course, of poetry, fictional narrative, theater, and television series. However, this generous attitude on the side of the audience is only conditionally granted to the author as a starting point, and should by no means be taken for granted; it is the author's duty to continue developing the plot in such a way as to maintain readers' willingness to suspend disbelief.
The term suspension of disbelief and the idea that it provides the basis for poetic faith was explicitly formulated by the English Romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge in 1817, who stated:
In this idea originated the plan of the "Lyrical Ballads"; in which it was agreed, that my endeavours should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic, yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith.
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Incidentally, science played a most significant role in shaping the intellectual horizon of Coleridge, and this poet embodies an interesting example of the interaction between Romanticism and early nineteenthcentury science.
19 Most remarkably, in a poem of 1791 titled "A Mathematical Problem," Coleridge addressed a question that is directly relevant to the relationship between "mathematics and narrative"-or, in this case, "mathematics and poetry." The introduction to the poem is in a letter to his brother (the reverend George Coleridge), from which, verbatim, I quote here: Coleridge thought that with the help of the muses and with the assistance of imagination, mathematics could be rescued from isolation and languidness. It is not necessary to strictly agree with him in order to realize that the triangular relationship we are analyzing here is illuminated with the help of his concept. Indeed, let us look again at diagram 5, which is the only one where mathematics in fiction appears in contraposition to the other two. There is a fundamental difference in the way we approach a scientific or historical text on the one hand, and a fictional or poetic text on the other. The basic contract between the author and reader in the former case is: "Don't believe a word of what I say.
Check by yourself and be as skeptical as you can. That is the test that I must undergo." In a scientific text, a technical or factual mistake is simply unacceptable. Factual mistakes are also unacceptable in historical texts, and, at the same time, any interpretation followed by a historian is at least amenable to criticism.
When reading a fictional text or poem, such attitudes are beyond the point. Here, the basic contract is very different, which says: "Give me the benefit of temporary suspension of disbelief. I will take you safely throughout the text and you are going to enjoy it." Deviations from the historical record or from scientific facts cannot only be acceptable in a piece of fictional narrative, sometimes, indeed, they are the driving force. Such deviations may have different effects in fiction if they are caused by obvious mistakes or are purposefully done by the author. In any case, deviations are acceptable in a way that they are not in scientific and historical texts. 21 I will return to this point below.
It can be argued, of course, that one can read a scientific text for the sake of aesthetic pleasure, and that, moreover, it is likely that on first reading a mathematical text, we shall be willing to suspend disbelief and bear with the author's arguments through the end to see where they are leading and how this is done. Although this is undeniable, it is only an option. Critical reading is mandatory: we have not properly read a scientific or historical text unless it be done with a critical eye.
The opposite is the case with a fictional text. We can read it critically (though we will hardly do this upon a first reading); we may bring to our reading the tools of the literary critic or the semiotic researcher or the historian, but again, these are options. The literary or poetic experience associated with the reading of a fictional text is the one associated with suspension of disbelief.
With this perspective in mind, I would like to analyze one important example that sheds additional light on the points discussed so far. My example is in the fictional prose of Jorge Luis Borges.
Borges was very fond of quoting Coleridge, and his literary output is based on a masterful implementation of the principle of suspension of disbelief. Borges's short stories take the idea behind the principle to unprecedented extremes; their success is based on the willingness of readers to bear with him in spite of the overtly counterfactual, paradoxical, unrealistic, and even illogical texts. Basic to most of his stories is some form of embedding fiction in reality: the characters and plots are so far from daily reality that the reader does not even start doubting them or their deeds. Suspension of disbelief is inherently forced upon the reader from the first line of any of his stories; as they develop, Borges adds sophisticate storytelling mechanisms that prevent readers from abandoning their initial attitude.
A useful example to consider is Borges's famous short story, "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius." It tells about a mysterious country called Uqbar and about Tlön, an imagined world whose description is the main subject of the texts of Uqbar's writers. Tlön represents an embodiment of Berkeley's idealistic philosophy, and the story develops and examines the functioning of such a world, thus providing an "epistemological metaphor" (to use a term coined by Umberto Eco in this context) of that philosophy.
The narrator first becomes aware of the existence of Tlön through an encyclopedia, as described in the opening passage of the story:
I owe the discovery of Uqbar to the conjunction of a mirror and an encyclopedia. The mirror troubled the far end of a hallway in a large country house on Calle Gaona, in Ramos Mejía; the encyclopedia is misleadingly titled
The Anglo-American Cyclopedia (New York, 1917) In fact, White discovered the existence of a real Anglo-American Enyclopedia, whose 1917 edition is is an exact reprint of the ninth edition of the Britannica. The details about the specific volumes mentioned by Borges in the story deserve closer inspection. Indeed, in the story, Borges looks, in vain, for the entry "Uqbar" in a copy of the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia that happens to exist in the house where the opening conversation takes place: "On the last pages of Volume XLVI-he says-we found an article on Uppsala; on the first pages of Volume XLVII, one on Ural-Altaic Languages, but not a word about Uqbar." Some days later, Borges has the opportunity to see Bioy's copy of the Cyclopaedia, where he had originally read the article on Uqbar, and this copy turns out to be somewhat different from
Borges's own.
The tome Bioy brought was, in fact, Volume XLVI of the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia. On the half-title page and the spine, the alphabetical marking (Tor-Ups) was that of our copy, but, instead of 917, it contained 921 pages. These four additional pages made up the article on Uqbar, which (as the reader will have noticed) was not indicated by the alphabetical marking. We later determined that there was no other difference between the volumes. Now, if we look, as Alan White did, at the real Anglo-American Encyclopedia, we find the following very remarkable facts: the last entry of Volume XLVI is indeed Uppsala, which ends up on page 917, whereas the first entry of Volume XLVII is indeed "Ural-Altaic Languages"! So, Borges is inserting his unreal country into the very close gaps reality provides him with. The basic contract between him as author and any prospective reader of the story is that the latter will suspend disbelief while reading;
Borges, however, anticipates the case that his reader may deviate from this basic contract and will start to read critically-that is, will try and find out whether the story is "true" or not. In this case, the reader will have a tough time, since, to begin with, he cannot be sure whether the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia really exists, and, if he happens to find a copy of it, once he arrives on page 917 of Volume XLVI, he will have to decide if the article on Uqbar could not actually come there, right after Uppsala.
Understanding the details of Borges's storytelling mechanism, then, helps getting a clearer conception of the implications of the idea of suspending disbelief, especially in contrast with the idea of a critical reading of a text. It is thus remarkable that, very often, commentators of Borges's work have failed to make this separation, and have continued to suspend disbelief where they were supposed to be reading critically. In this way, Borges has been credited, for instance, with a deep understanding of physical and mathematical theories, and, occasionally, even with the ability to anticipate such theories in his stories-thus, for instance, in the following assertion: "Borges discovered the essence of bifurcation theory thirty years before scientists formalized it in mathematical terms."
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Good reader that he was, Borges never confused these two opposed basic attitudes toward a text:
the critical one, and the benevolent one (where disbelief is suspended). One place where this dichotomy
is nicely reflected appears in one of his more recondite texts. To the collection Discusión three short book reviews were added, among which one finds, perhaps surprisingly, a book that is well-known to mathematicians though much less so to general readers: Goldbach, which asserts that every even number larger than "2" is the sum of two prime numbers. After completing his own training as a mathematician, the nephew becomes obsessed with finding out the true story of his uncle, whom other members of the family generally consider a failure.
The plot of the story is set within a genuine historical framework, which bestows upon its fictional parts an immediate credibility. For one thing, the Goldbach conjecture is indeed an open mathematical problem, which has not been settled to this day; for another, the life of the fictional Uncle
Petros is reliably embedded-at both the personal and professional levels-in the Cambridge University of Godfrey Hardy (1877 -1947 ), John Littlewood (1885 -1977 ), and Srinivasa Ramanujan (1877 -1920 , which is where Petros studied during 1917-19. There is, for example, a description of the analytic versus the algebraic tradition in number theory and their respective statuses at the beginning of the twentieth century in order to provide the framework for Petros's own work. Results connected with the important partition theorem, with which those mathematicians were deeply involved, are mentioned in connection with Ramanujan. Ramanujan's death in 1920 comes at the right time for Petros, from the standpoint of his endeavor to prove a result that he was afraid Ramanujan would accomplish before him.
In brief, there is a correct historical and mathematical setting of the fictional Petros within reality, and the narrative tension of the plot is comfortably built upon this premise. The book's readers have every reason to suspend disbelief and let the author led them through the story.
The plot, however, deviates from the historical record on several points. Most of these are clearly unintended, and they are of the kind that most readers will not even be aware of. Some deviations play an important role within the plot; for example, in a conversation between the narrator and his Uncle however, the true historical fact is that Carathéodory arrived in Berlin only in 1918! Here, we have an accepted historical fact (e.g., a date, place, name, or publication) incorrectly cited in the plot. As we previously saw in the example of Borges's story, mistakes like this one may be intentionally implemented for the purpose of strengthening the fictional effect; when unintended, though, may be the result of either simple oversight or the use of erroneous information. In the present example, the error is -22 -so marginal that it can hardly affect either readers' willingness to suspend disbelief or any other aspect of their engagement with the plot.
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The case of Hilbert's quotation in Doxiadis's book is much more interesting than the dates of For the same reason, historians nowadays may feel uncomfortable with the fact that Gödel's work had the immediate effect of profoundly changing Petros's current research program, which he had initially expected would lead to proving the conjecture. Nothing of the sort happen to any real 24 The mechanism of the reader's possible kinds of reactions to these kinds of mistakes is masterfully discussed in Eco, Six Walks (above, n. 21), pp. mathematicians. For historical and mathematical reasons, the way and pace by which the theorem and its consequences were absorbed by mainstream mathematicians, and even by logicians, was a very complex and slow one. Should all of this bother us as readers of Uncle Petros? The answer will most likely vary from reader to reader. Whether intended or not, the author has used a kind of poetic license that in some cases will continue eliciting readers' willingness to suspend disbelief of the story, plot, and characters, and in other cases will not. Moreover, there is another possible way that fiction overrides fact in Doxiadis's book, and, in my opinion, it is by far the most interesting and challenging one for both author and reader of mathematics in fiction. It relates to the "paratext" of the novel (to use Genette's term): namely, a short sentence added by Doxiadis to the book, extraneous to the plot, thanking two mathematicians, Ken Ribet and Keith
Conrad, for carefully reading the revised manuscript and correcting "numerous mistakes." Obviously, this sentence is intended mainly to imply mathematical mistakes, it being more than natural to expect that no one, least of all the author, would tolerate mathematical mistakes in a book of fiction on mathematics, and in general such mistakes would be considered more damaging to the value of the text than unintended historical mistakes. 26 These latter are most unwelcome, of course, but they are never considered to be completely damaging to the book-certainly not as damaging as mathematical mistakes. Moreover, in the final analysis, historical inaccuracies might be considered part of the poetic license process the author consciously implemented. But-and this is the interesting point-whereas we may discern in mathematics in fiction (as in fiction in general) intended departures from the historical Zeilberger, and all the rest, while ensuring that no high-brow scholar will be able to point out this or that historical inaccuracy in her plot. Throughout the book, however, the ASM Conjecture is (wrongly) described as follows:
28 let A n be the number of alternating sign matrices of dimension n x n bordered by +1s; then Moreover, let us assume that the story is so written that, based on this formulation of the conjecture, the author is able to enhance the basis for the credibility of the narrative fiction underlying the plot; for instance, that this is the key to unlocking the mystery of a series of murders in a world-class 27 On the conjecture and its history, Of course, anyone who knows some mathematics and/or history of mathematics automatically becomes (regarding reacting to mathematics in fiction) a suspect recalcitrant mathematician or highbrow scholar. Such readers of mathematics in fiction will certainly find it difficult to pass by in silence the deliberate distortion of the historical or mathematical record, even after having considered Aristotle's useful distinction. This distinction may assist our intellect in reacting with equanimity to poetic license taken by authors in such cases, but it will not always help our emotions to the same extent. We are still fully justified in fearing that ultimately the public perception of science is much more strongly shaped by mathematics in fiction (books and films) than by scholarly research on the history of mathematics. This is equally true for mathematics as it is for the movie Amadeus and classical music, for the movie Numerous examples could be added here. There is, of course, a big difference in the symbolic and emotional burden associated with each of these topics and the amount of people to which they are directly relevant. In this sense, the esoteric and essentially neutral character of mathematics and its 29 In fact, a novel does exist that tells the story of a series of murders in a world-class math department; see Guillermo Martinez, The Oxford Murders, trans. Sonia Soto (San Francisco: MacAdam/Cage, 2004) . It would be illuminating to discuss it against the background of this article; unfortunately, lack of space does not permit me to do so here.
remove from worldly affairs renders, generally speaking, the entire debate about mathematics and narrative fiction in a much more relaxed and detached manner than with other topics.
I would like to consider now a second successful example of mathematics in fiction: the play Partition, In the play, Namagiri interacts with Ramanujan in various aspects of his everyday life and continually provides him with mathematical ideas and insights; in fact, with her finger she literally writes on his tongue some of Ramanujan's fascinating equations. Namagiri also consults Fermat on the possible way to solve Fermat's Last Theorem (FLT), and at some point, he confesses he does not remember the original proof of his theorem, which had been written many years ago in the narrow margins of his copy of Diophantus's book. Based on a hint by Namagiri, Ramanujan suggests to Hardy a possible way to solve FLT, which is close to the way in which Andrew Wiles, in 1993, proved the Taniyama-Shimura Conjecture, from which the validity of FLT derives.
It is well-known to mathematicians now that Hardy and Ramanujan never worked on FLT. One may guess that, if while watching Partition, some mathematicians start shifting uncomfortably in their seats, in most cases it will be because of this deviation from the known historical record. Most mathematicians will find it easier to accept that a Hindu goddess speaks, in English, with a seventeenthcentury mathematician about a recondite problem, and that she then conveys, again in English, this acquired knowledge to Ramanujan. Indeed, in a review of the play published in the Notices of the AMS by the Cal-Berkeley number-theorist Ken Ribet precisely this point is addressed, and in terms not very different from what has been suggested above. Ribet wrote:
Professional mathematicians who saw the play were disturbed by the prominent roles given to Fermat and his Last Theorem, since the real Ramanujan and Hardy did no work on this particular problem. I personally was startled by the implicit anachronistic suggestion that Ramanujan was close to finding a proof of Fermat's Last
Theorem that relied on Galois representations, modular forms, Euler systems, and Selmer groups.
In order to enjoy the play, one must relax the implicit identification between the historical Hardy-Ramanujan and the characters on stage. Theater-goers who have little problem observing a goddess in discussion with a seventeenthcentury mathematician on stage can make their peace with a historical distortion that allows the audience to hook up with a familiar and famous problem. Once I was able to separate the real Hardy and Ramanujan from their counterparts on stage, I found only good things to say about "Partition"."
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Although at first reticent to accept the mathematical anachronism implied in the plot, Ribet can nevertheless come to terms with it by implicitly adopting the Aristotelian distinction about the plot and characters featured in the play. But I wonder how this willingness to accept poetic license would work if the play contained an inaccuracy pertaining not to the history of the subject, but rather to some part in its core body of knowledge, such as the formulation of a result or the details of a certain proof.
Unfortunately, this is not a question that can be easily answered, because of a lack of significant, relevant examples.
Hauptman's choice of FLT as the mathematical focus of her play seems rather natural and is hardly surprising. Indeed, given the enormous public attention that FLT attracted in the wake of Wiles's proof (and about which more is said in the next section), it became a favorite of writers of mathematics in fiction. One of the most ingenious examples of poetic license related to FLT that I can cite appears in a rather unlikely setting: the television series, The Simpsons. This is a mathematical joke appearing in a broader context, rather than a real work of mathematics in fiction; and yet, it touches upon the core point of what might be the real test for poetic license in mathematics in fiction. Although minor in scope, this example concerns the body of a well-known mathematical result and distorts it in a rather cavalier and unapologetic way. FLT establishes that for n > 2, the equation , is correct up to ten. In other words, the mathematical fact has not only been distorted, but it has been distorted in a way that is not immediately detectable; indeed, because of rounding-off errors, these equations will appear as correct in most handheld calculators. Also, the popular television series Star Trek included its share of FLT. As the series is set in the future, it turned out at some point that one of the chapters retrospectively contained an unintended mistake created by poetic license. Indeed, in an episode aired in 1989, Captain Picard stated that FLT had remained unsolved for 800 years. Wiles proof of 1994 therefore posed a problem. Hence, in an episode of 1995, the statement in the 1989 episode was subtly corrected when reference was made to "one the most original approaches to the proof [of FLT] since Wiles over 300 years ago." See http://www.twiztv.com/scripts/ds9/season3/ds9-325.txt. FLT also appears prominently in Martinez's The Oxford Murders (above, n. 29).
In the next section, I would like to consider the triangular relationship from a different perspective-namely, how the dramatic dimension enters the writing of historical accounts of mathematics, principally of the popular kind.
Dramatizing the History of Mathematics:
Dennis Guedj has used the nice metaphor of "the drama of axiomatics" 32 to describe the fact that in an axiomatized mathematical theory, the contents of a theorem are logically implicit in the axioms from the beginning, and that in the derivation of a theorem from the axioms, there is an inexorability of the kind that characterizes a drama. One may perhaps wonder about the details of the path from the axioms to the theorem (i.e., the details of the plot), but there is no escape from the one possible denouement of this story. This metaphor, however, turns highly problematic when its scope is extended beyond the logical aspect and its inexorability is attributed to the history of mathematics as well. I would like to illustrate this underlying problem by referring to a recent, well-known example: Simon Singh's Fermat's Engima.
Fermat's Engima is possibly the best selling and most widely known among a relatively large group of popular books on mathematics that has appeared during the past ten years. As such, I think it is fair to say that it has done a greater service to the recent public perception of mathematics than any other individual text. In order to write his book on FLT, Singh certainly needed to expend great efforts in order to gather and digest an enormous amount of relevant mathematical material, and to present it in a more or less popular version. By all means, this was a difficult and laudable task and in order to accomplish it, Singh relied on a far-reaching dramatic structure to support a narrative specifically designed to retain the attention of readers throughout. In doing so, however, the book contains a great amount of misconceptions about the history of mathematics, not only concerning specific details, but also of broader issues-the over-dramatization of the history of mathematics among the latter. For better or worse, over the last decade Fermat's Enigma has played a role similar to that, several decades ago, of Eric Temple Bell's Men of Mathematics.
This over-dramatized approach is evident even before commencing reading the book, as the publisher (at least in some editions) stated that this is "the epic quest to solve the world's greatest mathematical problem." The cause is supported by no less a scientist than Sir Roger Penrose, who is quoted as stating that the book is "[a]n excellent account of one of the most dramatic and moving events of the century." No less than that! And then, on the dust jacket, we read the following:
FLT became the Holy Grail of mathematics. Whole and colorful lives were devoted, and even sacrificed, to finding a proof. Leonhard Euler, the greatest mathematician of the eighteenth century, had to admit defeat. Sophie
Germain took on the identity of a man to do research in a field forbidden to females, and made the most Lives "devoted, and even sacrificed" in the pursuit of an abstruse mathematical question is definitely a story worthy of attention, but on closer inspection, every sentence in this description turns out, at best, to be a dramatic overstatement. 33 This spirit of over-dramatization dominates the greater part of the book.
The preface, for instance, opens with the following passage:
33 For a detailed discussion of Singh's book, including a critical examination of each of the names mentioned in this paragraph and their real connection (or, more often, lack of connection) with work on FLT, see Leo Corry, "El Teorema de Fermat y sus Historias," Gaceta de la Real Sociedad Matemática Española 9 (2006): 387-424.
The story of Fermat's Last Theorem is inextricably linked with the history of mathematics, touching on all the major themes of number theory. … The Last Theorem is at the heart of an intriguing saga of courage, skullduggery, cunning, and tragedy, involving all the greatest heroes of mathematics.
In this way, the dramatizing effect comes to be closely connected with the "royal-road-to-X" approach mentioned in the first part of this essay. Not only are many intriguing episodes in the history of mathematics captured on behalf of the drama's denouement even if, historically, they have nothing or very little to do with FLT, 34 but many significant and highly interesting mathematical developments that were at the heart of the attempts to prove Fermat's conjecture are completely ignored just because in the final account they did not become part of the triumphant party. 35 To be sure, within the entire story of FLT, the episode involving Wiles and his lifetime interest in FLT is perhaps the one that comes closest to real personal drama of the kind implied by Singh's account. But then, on the other hand, it is precisely because of this over-dramatization of the entire story that the true historical and mathematical import of Wiles's formidable accomplishment in proving the Taniyama-Shimura conjecture cannot be adequately conveyed to the reader.
34 This is clearly the case with the inclusion of Galois in the book. He was a most prominent figure of early nineteenth-century mathematics, but has no connection whatsoever with FLT. His inclusion, however, comes as no surprise, because even more than FLT, his life and work are the subjects receiving the highest degree of attention in terms of mathematics in fiction, and have been more consistently over-dramatized in historical or pseudo-historical accounts than others. The reason is simple: whereas the external components of the biographies of most mathematicians are boring and repetitive ("born . . ., studied at . . ., dissertation on . . ., his most important work was . . ., was honored . . ., and so on), Galois's is the only one whose biography boasts the romantic privilege of having been killed in a duel for a woman, in addition to his explosive personality, with incursions into violent politics. A list of fiction works about Galois appears in Laura Toti Rigatelli, Evariste Galois, 1811 -1832 (Boston: Birkhäuser, 1996 It would be too easy to explain Singh's approach by saying that this is a popularization, a book that successfully fulfils its aim, and that its over-dramatized aspects more faithfully serve its purposenamely, introducing a broader audience to the world of mathematics, its people and ideas. Regardless whether one accepts such a claim, it is important to bear in mind that this over-dramatized image of the history of science has been essentially shared by the scientists themselves, and that until relatively recently it was commonly found as well in much of the mainstream academic historiography of science.
Indeed, as Yehuda Elkana insightfully stressed more than twenty-five years ago, this view was an outgrowth of a long-ingrained tradition in Western culture that identifies "fate in Greek tragedy with the order of nature," and thus views "natural occurrences and events as inevitable." This point of view, Elkana asserted, was later extended so as to cover not only the natural events in the world, but also the unfolding of human knowledge about the world:
The conviction emerged and grew, leading up to its positivistic absoluteness in the Victorian frame of mind, that not only there is one reality with it immutable laws, but also that we humans are on a sure course to find out all, or at least cumulatively more and more about the reality: one nature, one truth about The whole atmosphere of tense interest was exactly that of the Greek drama: we are the chorus commenting on the decree of destiny as disclosed in the development of a supreme incident. There was dramatic quality in the very staging: the traditional ceremonial, and in the background the picture of Newton to remind us that the greatest of scientific generalizations was, now, after more than two centuries, to receive its first modification. As we see it now-at variance with Whitehead's description-the case of the eclipse expedition and its aftermath provides an enlightening example of things that happened in a certain way, but could have happened in a very different way. Indeed, I think it is fair to assert, at the risk of a too-broad generalization, that a considerable portion of interesting research in the history of science over the last two decades has become much closer to the epic theater perspective that to the Greek drama one. It will be interesting to see how fictional narratives on science, and particularly on mathematics, as well as popular books on the same topics, catch up with this important development.
Concluding Remarks -Can Mathematics in Fiction Interfere with Mathematical
Reality?
According to Umberto Eco, we read fictional texts because they come to the aid of our metaphysical narrowmindedness and offer an illusion of order within a world whose complete structure we are unable to grasp and describe. Since we know that fictional universes are created by an "authorial entity," we also know that there is a "message" behind them. The very confidence we hold of the existence of this message is, in the first place, what allows us to decipher it, or at least to think we are on the way toward deciphering it. This explains why we feel comfortable in fictional worlds. The actual world, on the other hand, does not offer this confidence; rather, "since the dawn of time, humans have been wondering whether there is a message, and, if so, whether this message makes sense."
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We can now ask ourselves: Is this argument valid for mathematics and mathematics in fiction?
We surely know that fictional narratives, even if they are about mathematical themes, are created by an authorial entity. But what about the mathematics itself? What can we say about that "actual world"
around which authors of mathematics in fiction build their fictional universes? One may question, in the first place, whether this "actual world" is indeed actual, or is it fictional? One may question whether there exists an authorial entity behind this actual world of mathematics. But no one will deny that the kind of comfort that Eco attributes to our experience with fictional worlds is manifest in a very remarkable way in our encounters with mathematics. True, some people experience difficulties in technically mastering the world of mathematics; but once mastered, it provides perhaps the utmost example of a fictional (or fictional-like) world where the certainty of an underlying message is strongly felt, and where, indeed, progress is continually and consistently made on the way to elucidating that message.
Eco also calls attention to that very remarkable phenomenon of intertextuality whereby fictional characters start to migrate from one fictional work to another. When this happens, he says, the characters "have acquired citizenship in the real world and have freed themselves from the story that created them." 43 When one thinks about mathematics in these terms, a rather original explanation seems to arise about the fundamental Platonic attitude of the typical working mathematician. Whatever his or her 42 Eco, Six Walks (above, n. 21), p. 116. In this book (and in most others of his as well), Eco openly acknowledges the strong presence of Borges's ideas in his formulations. This is the case in particular for this passage, which seems to have been taken directly, for instance, from Borges's "The God's Script." See also Leo Corry, "Jorge Borges: Author of 'The Name of the Rose,'" in Umberto Eco, vol. professed philosophical beliefs, the typical mathematician will relate to objects of investigation as part of an external reality that can be objectively known. 44 Following along Eco's line, mathematical entities (such as groups, functions, topological spaces, algorithms, or whatever) can be seen as fictions that arise within a certain text, and then start to migrate to ever new ones until they become ubiquitous and eventually acquire their status of autonomous, "actual" entities. A mechanism similar to the one that applies to characters of fictional narrative that at some point liberate themselves from the texts in which they first appeared-Sherlock Holmes is a favorite example of Eco's-seems to be at play in this case.
Finally, if fiction so strongly fascinates us, Eco asks, may it not be "that we interpret life as fiction, and that in interpreting reality we introduce fictional elements?" 45 Little needs to be said here about how, ever since the seventeenth century, science has been interpreting reality with the help of mathematical ideas. The latter can, in this context at least, be considered as fictions that help us interpret reality. The specific example that Eco refers to, however, seems to point in a different direction, which we might also consider here. He shows in detail how the text of The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion arose from various, purely fictional sources, and how its very existence was effectively taken by its readers to be a confirmation of the message it conveyed. This is a most salient example of fiction intruding into real life with tremendous historical consequences. Can we imagine a similar situation in the case of mathematics? I can think of very few examples of this kind, but there is at least a recent one that cannot be overlooked: Andrew Wiles and FLT.
Wiles's fascination with FLT reportedly started in his childhood when he read Eric Temple
Bell's The Last Problem (1962) . This book, together with Bell's better-known, indeed legendary Men of Mathematics (1937) , are among the most salient examples of histories of mathematics written in the over-dramatized style I discussed above as a series of essentially undocumented legends about mathematical heroes. 46 This approach, which serious historians love to hate, catches the imaginations of young readers. Some of these readers become research mathematicians, which was the case with Wiles.
Had the young, mathematically gifted child read a more restrained, less dramatic account of the kind I praised above-because of its historiographical and scholarly qualities-it is rather unlikely that FLT would have kindled Wiles's imagination as it did. He launched his professional career without devoting any research to FLT, and subsequently became prominent in the fields he investigated. But in 1986, when certain recent developments indicated that FLT had become a mathematical task that might be solved by proving a well-defined, though obviously highly challenging conjecture, he decided to take up the challenge, remembering his early interest in it. Thus he was emotionally motivated to undertake the long and difficult quest to prove FLT, which eventually, more than eight years later, resulted in his sensation success. Bell's account then, which was essentially fictional even if related to actual historical events, did intrude upon the real world of mathematics and led, with the help of Wiles, to its transformation.
And yet I would like to suggest that the truly ultimate way in which fiction could impact the actual world of mathematics would be if a novel on mathematical issues in which some kind of mathematical idea was suggested (for example, a certain way to solve a celebrated unsolved problem) eventually resulted in a reader formulating an actual solution to the problem. I know of no example of this kind in history, and I doubt that it could happen. Most likely the mechanisms controlling the relation between "reality" and "narrative fiction" are of a different kind when it comes to mathematics.
